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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a novel approach for reducing the k-item n-bidder auction
with additive valuation to k-item 1-bidder auctions. This approach, called the Best-Guess
reduction, can be applied to address several central questions in optimal revenue auction
theory such as the power of randomization, and Bayesian versus dominant-strategy imple-
mentations. First, when the items have independent valuation distributions, we present a
deterministic mechanism called Deterministic Best-Guess that yields at least a constant
fraction of the optimal revenue by any randomized mechanism. Second, if all the nk
valuation random variables are independent, the optimal revenue achievable in dominant
strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) is shown to be at least a constant fraction of that
achievable in Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC). Third, when all the nk values are
identically distributed according to a common one-dimensional distribution F , the opti-
mal revenue is shown to be expressible in the closed form Θ(k(r +
∫mr
0 (1 − F (x)
n) dx))
where r = supx≥0 x(1 − F (x)
n) and m = ⌈k/n⌉; this revenue is achievable by a simple
mechanism called 2nd-Price Bundling. All our results apply to arbitrary distributions,
regular or irregular.
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1 Introduction
Consider the multiple items auction problem, in which a seller wants to sell k items to n bid-
ders who have private values for these items, drawn from some possibly correlated probability
distributions. We are interested in studying incentive compatible mechanisms under which the
bidders are incentivized to report their values truthfully. One major question is how to design
such mechanisms which can maximize the expected revenue for the seller.
The single-item case (k = 1) was resolved by Myerson’s classic work [25] when the bidders’
values for the item are independently distributed. The general multiple-item case (k > 1) is
provably harder (e.g., [13][14]), and has in recent years been intensively studied in the litera-
ture. In particular, when the inputs are discrete, much progress has been made on the efficient
computation of the optimal revenue (e.g., [6][7][8][9]). Another direction is to design simple
mechanisms for approximating optimal revenues in various settings (e.g., [10][11][21][27]). How-
ever, there remain important aspects of the multiple-item auction that are not well understood.
Most of the known results put restrictions on the distributions (e.g., [4][8][9]). Also, the com-
putational methods proposed typically find the optimal revenue by solving some mathematical
programming problems, which do not yield mathematical formulas for the optimal revenue (or
its approximation), even for relatively simple input distributions. To name some intriguing open
questions: Is it possible to express the optimal revenue in terms of the valuation distributions
elegantly, can the optimal revenue be achieved by some simple mechanism, and is the require-
ment of dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DIC) much more stringent than Bayesian
incentive compatibility (BIC)?
In this paper, we introduce a novel approach for reducing k-item n-bidder auctions with ad-
ditive valuations to k-item 1-bidder auctions. This approach, called the Best-Guess reduction,
can be applied to address some of the above central questions in optimal revenue auction theory
regarding the power of randomization, and Bayesian versus dominant-strategy. First, when the
items have independent valuation distributions, we present a deterministic mechanism called
Deterministic Best-Guess that yields at least a constant fraction of the best randomized mech-
anism. Second, if all the nk valuation random variables are independent, the optimal revenue
achievable in dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) is at least a constant fraction of
that achievable in Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC). Third, when all the nk values are iden-
tically distributed according to a common one-dimensional distribution F , the optimal revenue
can be expressed in the closed form Θ(k(r+
∫ mr
0
(1−F (x)n) dx)) where r = supx≥0 x(1−F (x)
n)
and m = ⌈k/n⌉; this revenue is achievable by a simple mechanism called 2nd-Price Bundling.
All our results apply to arbitrary distributions, regular or irregular.
Related Work: The reduction of mechanism design from an n-bidder multi-item auction to
1-bidder multi-item auction was considered in Alaei [1] with a different approach, which did
not yield constant factor approximation in the DSIC model (except under restrictions such
as ‘budget-balanced cross monotonicity’; see also [2]). Recently, Hart and Nisan [18] started
a line of research (see [3][16][19][22][29]) for studying simple mechanisms for 1-bidder k-item
auctions with provable performance bounds for arbitrary distributions; some of these results will
be needed in our paper. The question of how much randomization helps in auction mechanism
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design has been studied in a variety of models (e.g., [5][12][20]). In some situations, such as
in the 1-bidder case (Babaioff et al. [3]) and in the n-bidder unit-demand setting (Chawla et
al. [12]), it is known that randomized mechanisms can yield at most a constant factor over
deterministic mechanisms. The question of how much more revenue BIC implementation can
yield over DSIC has a large literature (e.g., Gershkov et al. [15], Manelli and Vincent [24]).
For the one-dimensional models (i.e. k = 1), starting with Myerson’s classical work, strict
equivalence between BIC and DSIC has been established in various contexts. It is widely agreed
that strict equivalence is false for the multi-dimensional settings, but how much revenue can
BIC yield over DSIC is largely unknown.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basic Concepts
Let F be a multi-dimensional distribution on [0,∞)nk. Consider the k-item n-buyer auction
problem where the valuation n × k matrix x = (xji ) is drawn from F . Buyer i has xi ≡
(x1i , x
2
i , · · · , x
k
i ) as his valuations of the k items. For convenience, let x−i denote the valuations
of all buyers except buyer i; that is, x−i = (xi′ | 1 ≤ i
′ 6= i ≤ n).
A mechanism M specifies an allocation q(x) = (qji (x)) ∈ [0,∞)
nk, where qji (x) denotes the
probability that item j is allocated to buyer i when x = (xji ) is reported to M by the buyers.
We require that
∑n
i=1 q
j
i (x) ≤ 1 for all j, so that the total probability of allocating item j is
at most 1. M also specifies a payment si(x) ∈ (−∞,∞) for buyer i. A mechanism is called
dominant-strategy individually rational (DSIR) if for each i and x,
∑k
j=1 x
j
i q
j
i (x)−si(x) ≥ 0, i.e.,
a buyer gets at least as much in (reported) value as he pays for. A mechanism is called dominant-
strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if for every i, xi, x−i, x
′
i,
∑k
j=1 x
j
i q
j
i (xi, x−i)− si(xi, x−i) ≥∑k
j=1 x
j
i q
j
i (x
′
i, x−i)−si(x
′
i, x−i). That is, buyer i does not gain any more utility by mis-reporting
xi as x
′
i, given that all other buyers maintain their reported valuations.
We also consider a weaker version of rationality and incentive compatibility that is widely
adopted. A mechanism is called Bayesian individual rational (BIR) if each buyer i gets at
least as much value as he pays for in the average sense, when all other buyers report truthfully.
More precisely, BIR requires that for every i and xi, Ex−i(
∑k
j=1 x
j
iq
j
i (xi, x−i) − si(xi, x−i)) ≥
0. Similarly, a mechanism is called Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) if for every i, xi, x
′
i,
Ex−i(
∑k
j=1 x
j
i q
j
i (xi, x−i)− si(xi, x−i)) ≥ Ex−i(
∑k
j=1 x
j
i q
j
i (x
′
i, x−i)− si(x
′
i, x−i)).
Let s(x) =
∑n
i=1 si(x) be the total payments received by the seller. For any mechanism
M on F , let sM(F) = Ex∼F(s(x)) be the (expected) revenue received by the seller from all
buyers. The optimal revenue is defined as REV (F) = supM sM(F) when M ranges over all the
DSIR and DSIC mechanisms. Similarly, in the Bayesian model, the optimal revenue is defined
as REVBayesian(F) = supM sM(F) when M ranges over all the BIR and BIC mechanisms. A
mechanism is said to be deterministic if all qji (z) ∈ {0, 1}. Let DREV (F) denote the sup of
revenue over all deterministic DSIR-DSIC mechanisms for distribution F .
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One well-known DSIR and DSIC mechanism is the Vickrey 2nd-price mechanism [30] applied
to each item. That is, for each item j, the seller awards the item to the highest bidder (with
any specified tie-breaking rule) on this item but at the 2nd highest bid price. Let X = (Xji ) be
the random variable matrix distributed according to F . Let Xj[2nd] be the 2nd largest of Xji ,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, and X [2nd] =
∑k
j=1X
j[2nd]. Then the revenue of this Vickrey 2nd-price mechanism
Mvr is Ex∼F(X
[2nd]), and hence REV (F) ≥ Ex∼F(X
[2nd]). Let B(X−i) denote (Y
1, Y 2, · · · , Y k),
where Y j = max{Xji′ |i
′ 6= i}. That is, B(X−i) is the maximum bid among all buyers except
buyer i. (Remark : We sometimes write lower case x for the random variable X when there is
no confusion, or write XF to emphasize its relationship with F .)
2.2 β-Exclusive Mechanisms and the β-Bundling
In this subsection we restrict ourselves to 1-buyer k-item auctions. In this case DSIR=BIR and
DSIC=BIC, and we can simply call them IR, IC. For 1-bidder k-item auctions, we introduce a
concept called β-exclusive mechanisms which will be central to our reduction method. Let L be
any distribution1 over [0,∞)k, and β = (β1, β2, · · · , βk) a vector from [0,∞)k.
Definition 2.1. Given L and β, a mechanism M is called β-exclusive if qjM(z) = 0 whenever
zj ≤ βj; that is, an item j with bid equal to or below the threshold βj will not be allocated to the
bidder. Let REV X(L, β) be supM(Ez∼L(sM(z))) over all β-exclusive IR-IC mechanisms M, and
we refer to REV X(L, β) as the optimal β-exclusive revenue for L.
As an example, the familiar concept of Myerson’s reserve price for each item may be viewed as
a special case of β-exclusion. Also, any mechanism M can be easily converted into a 0-exclusive
mechanism with the same revenue by setting qj(z) to 0 whenever zj = 0.
We introduce the following β-exclusive mechanism, called β-Bundling. This mechanism will
be useful in providing a deterministic implementation of our reduction in Theorem 3. (We
remark that bundling is a widely studied mechanism with many interesting variants, see e.g.
[17] [23] [26] [28].)
First consider, for any β ∈ [0,∞)k and w ≥ 0, the mechanism Mβ,w with allocation q and
payment s, defined as follows:
If
∑
j,zj>βj
(zj − βj)


≥ w, then s(z) = w +
∑
j,zj>βj β
j,
qj(z) = 1 if zj > βj and qj(z) = 0 otherwise;
< w, then s(z) = 0,
qj(z) = 0 for all j.
Use Mβ,w(L) to denote its revenue Ez∼L(s(z)). (The parameter w may be regarded as an
additional surcharge that the mechanism imposes on any bundle.)
1Throughout this paper, we use L to denote the value distribution for 1-bidder auction, and F the value
distribution for n-bidder auction.
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Definition 2.2. For any β ∈ [0,∞)k, let R(β) = {(β, w)|w ≥ 0}∪{(β, 0)| β ≥ β}. Given distri-
bution L, the β-Bundling for L is defined to be the mechanism Mβ,w, where (β, w) is chosen
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to maximize Mβ,w(L) over all (β, w) ∈ R(β). That is, (β, w) = argmax(β,w)∈R(β)Mβ,w(L). We
use Bund(L, β) to denote the revenue of the β-Bundling mechanism for L.
Lemma 2.1. The β-Bundling for L is a deterministic IR-IC mechanism.
Proof. Immediate from the definition.
It will be shown in Section 6 (Theorem 6.1) that, when L = L1 × L2 × · · · × Lk, this
bundling mechanism yields a constant fraction of REV X(L, β), the best revenue achievable by
any β-exclusive mechanism.
3 Main Results
We start by considering the 1-bidder k-item auction. Let L be any distribution over [0,∞)k,
and β a vector from [0,∞)k. To provide a good benchmark for REV X(L, β), we define below an
adjusted revenue for any general IR-IC mechanism M (not necessarily β-exclusive), where the
portion of M’s revenue from allocating low-value items (relative to β) is effectively discounted.
Definition 3.1. Let L and β be given. For any IR-IC mechanism M with allocation qM and
payment sM , define its β-adjusted revenue for L as Ex∼L(sM(x, β)), where sM(x, β) = sM(x)−∑
j, xj≤βj q
j
M (x)x
j. Let REV A(L, β) be supMEx∼L(sM(x, β)) over all IR-IC mechanisms M , and
we refer to REV A(L, β) as the optimal β-adjusted revenue for L .
Note that, if M is a β-exclusive mechanism, then its β-adjusted revenue is equivalent to its
normal revenue. Our first theorem compares the optimal β-exclusive revenue REV X(L, β) with
the optimal β-adjusted revenue REV A(L, β); this result will play a crucial role in our n-bidder
to 1-bidder reduction.
Theorem 1. [β-Exclusion Theorem] For any L = L1×L2×· · ·×Lk and β ∈ [0,∞)k, we have
REV X(L, β) ≥ 1
8
REV A(L, β).
We now propose a reduction called Best-Guess for the n-bidder k-item auction F . Under this
reduction, only the top bidder for each item may get the item. The seller performs n separate
1-buyer auctions as follows: In the auction for bidder i, the seller uses a β-exclusive mechanism
to enforce the top-bid constraint, where β = B(x−i), i.e., β
j = max{xji′ | i
′ 6= i}.
Best-Guess Reduction for distribution F
Given the n × k bid matrix x = (xji ) distributed according to F , the seller
conducts with each bidder i a 1-bidder k-item auction with xi = (x
j
i |1 ≤
j ≤ k) as the bid; the seller uses an IR-IC revenue-optimal B(x−i)-exclusive
mechanism with respect to the distribution xi ∼ Xi|x−i.
2In case the sup is not achieved at any finite point, we then simply pick a point (β,w) with revenue arbitrarily
close to the sup.
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It is clear that the Best-Guess Reduction is indeed a valid mechanism (i.e., with each item
getting total allocation ≤ 1) that is DSIR and DSIC. We will use BGR(F) to denote its
expected total revenue. In actually implementing Best-Guess, we may employ a B(x−i)-exclusive
mechanism that is α-approximate for each buyer i (rather than a truly optimal mechanism),
that is, one that yields at least 1/α of the the optimal B(x−i)-exclusive mechanism’s revenue.
We refer to this modified version of Best-Guess as α-approximate Best-Guess. The resulting
mechanism (by choosing any α-approximate mechanism for each buyer i) is clearly DSIR-DSIC;
we call it a BGRα-mechanism and denote
3 its revenue by BGRα(F). In particular, when
α = 1, we have BGR1(F) = BGR(F), the revenue of the Best-Guess Reduction itself.
Note that BGR(F) may not always yield good revenue; for example, BGR(F) = 0 when all
valuations xji are equal to a constant c. However, by simply taking the better of BGR(F) and
Ex∼F(X
[2nd]) (which is the revenue of the 2nd-price Vickrey mechanism), one can show that a
constant fraction of REV (F) is guaranteed when the items are independent.
Theorem 2. The Best-Guess Reduction is a DSIR-DSIC mechanism. Furthermore, for any
F = F1 × · · · × Fk, we have BG(F) ≡ max{BGR(F), Ex∼F(X
[2nd])} ≥ 1
9
REV (F).
Theorem 2 says that, when REV (F) is much larger (say 9 times more) than what the
Vickrey 2nd-price can produce, Best-Guess Reduction can extract the revenue more effectively.
Also note that BG(F) is realizable by the mechanism formally defined as follows:
Mechanism BG:
If BGR(F)
{
≥ Ex∼F(X
[2nd]) then use the Best-Guess Reduction;
< Ex∼F(X
[2nd]) then use Vickrey 2nd-price mechanism.
The following Corollary generalizes Theorem 2 to the α-approximate version of Best-Guess.
Corollary. The revenue BGRα(F) of any α-approximate mechanism satisfies
max{BGRα(F), E(X
[2nd]
F )} ≥
1
8α+1
REV (F).
Theorem 2 corresponds to the α = 1 case of the Corollary. The revenue max{BGRα(F), E(X
[2nd]
F )}
can be realized, as before, by a Mechanism BGRα which identifies with the better (for distri-
bution F) between a given BGRα-mechanism and the Vickrey 2nd-price mechanism.
Deterministic Best-Guess Reduction (DBGR) for distribution F
Given the n × k bid matrix x = (xji ), the seller conducts with each bidder
i a 1-bidder k-item auction with xi = (x
j
i |1 ≤ j ≤ k) as the bid; the seller
uses the β-Bundling mechanism for distribution L, where β = B(x−i) and L
is defined by Xi|x−i.
Theorem 3. DBGR is a deterministic DSIR-DSIC mechanism. Furthermore, if F = F1 ×
· · · × Fk, then DBGR is a BGRα-mechanism for F where α = 8.5.
3Here we are slightly abusing the notation for the sake of brevity. When the notation BGRα(F) is used, the
specific α-approximate mechanism used for each buyer will be clear from context.
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From Theorem 3 and Corollary to Theorem 2, we have max{DBGR(F), E(X
[2nd]
F )} ≥
1
69
REV (F). In other words, the following deterministic mechanism can realize revenue 1
69
REV (F):
Mechanism DBG:
If DBGR(F)
{
≥ Ex∼F(X
[2nd]) then use the Deterministic Best-Guess Reduction;
< Ex∼F(X
[2nd]) then use a deterministic Vickrey 2nd-price mechanism.
Corollary. DREV (F) ≥ 1
69
REV (F) if F = F1 × · · · × Fk.
Turning next to a different question, we show that, if all the nk value distributions are
independent (though not necessarily identical), then the optimal revenues are equivalent, up to
constant factor, for the Bayesian and the dominant strategy settings.
Theorem 4. If F = ⊗i,jF
j
i , then REVBayesian(F) ≤ 9REV (F).
If all the nk value distributions are independent and identical, we can obtain a formula in
closed-form. We propose a new mechanism, called Second-Price Bundling (SPB), as a heuristic
for approximating DBGR. Let a parameter w ≥ 0 be first chosen.
Second-Price Bundling (SPB) with parameter w
The SPB mechanism picks for each item a maximum bidder (breaking ties
using the uniform random rule); let Ji be the set of items for which bidder
i is the selected maximum bidder. For each i, the seller makes a take-or-
leave offer for all the items in Ji (as one bundle) to bidder i, at the price
w +
∑
j∈Ji
xj[2nd].
In this scheme, the parameter w serves as a surcharge on top of the second price to enhance
the revenue. SPB can be regarded as a simplified version of DBGR, in which the Bundling
mechanisms applied to different bidders have a common, fixed surcharge w. For any F , let
SPB(F) be the maximum revenue that can be generated by any mechanism in the SPB family
(that is, over all possible choices of parameter w). In the 1-bidder case, bundling is known [22]
to yield at least a constant fraction of the optimal revenue for iid items. Theorem 5 shows that,
for n bidders, SPB similarly achieves a constant fraction of the optimal revenue when all the
nk valuation random variables are iid according to a common one-dimensional distribution F .
We denote such a valuation distribution F by F n⊗k.
Theorem 5. Let F = F n⊗k, r = supx≥0 x(1− F (x)) and m = ⌈k/n⌉.
(a) REV (F) = Θ(k(r +
∫ mr
0
(1− F (x)n) dx));
(b) SPB is an IR-IC mechanism for any chosen parameter value w, and SPB(F) = Θ(REV (F)).
We remark that the constants in the Θ notations in Theorems 5 are universal constants, i.e.,
independent of n, k, and F . We will prove Theorems 1-5 in Sections 4-9. In addition to the
above main results, Theorems 5.3, 6.1, 7.1 and 9.1 may also be of some independent interest.
The Appendix contains the proofs of some auxiliary lemmas left out of the main text.
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4 Theorem 1: Effect of β-Exclusion
In this section we prove Theorem 1. First some notations. Let L = L1×· · ·×Lk be a distribution
over [0,∞)k, and β = (β1, β2, · · · , βk) ∈ [0,∞)k. Let Y j be the random variables corresponding
to Lj. Define ξj = Pr{Y j > βj}. For any real number α, let Y jα be the random variable obtained
as follows: with probability ξj, generate Y j|(Y j > βj); otherwise let Y jα = α.
Definition 4.1. For any u = (u1, · · · , uk), let Yu = Y
1
u1 × · · · × Y
k
uk
. Define L+β = Yβ, and
L−β = Yγ where γ = (0, · · · , 0).
Lemma 4.1. For any u ∈ [0, β1]× · · · × [0, βk], REV A(Yu, β) ≤ REV
X(Yu, u).
Proof. Let M be any IR-IC mechanism with allocation q and payment s. We construct
mechanism M ′ with allocation q′ and payment s′ defined by: for any z in the support of Yu and
any j, let
q′j(z) =
{
qj(z) if zj > uj
0 otherwise,
s′(z) = s(z)−
∑
j, zj=uj
uj · qj(z).
It is easy to verify thatM ′ is u-exclusive, IR-IC, and Ez∼Yu(s
′(z)) = Ez∼Yu(s(z, β)). This proves
REV A(Yu, β) ≤ REV
X(Yu, u), and hence Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.2. REV A(L, β) ≤ REV (L−β ).
Proof. Clearly, with γ = (0, · · · , 0) we have
REV (L−β ) = REV
A(Yγ, β).
We will prove Lemma 4.2 in two steps:
Step 1. Prove that there exists u ∈ [0, β1]×· · ·×[0, βk] such that REV A(L, β) ≤ REV A(Yu, β);
Step 2. Prove that REV A(Yu, β) ≤ REV
A(Yγ, β).
For Step 1, we let G(0) = L, and construct a sequence u1, u2 · · · inductively by choosing u
j to
maximize the value of REV A(G(j+1), β) where G(j) stands for Y 1u1 × · · · × Y
j−1
uj−1 × Y
j × · · · × Y k.
We claim that, for each j,
REV A(G(j), β) ≤ REV A(G(j+1), β). (1)
If ξj = 1 then for any choice of uj, Y j
uj
= Y j , and hence Eq. 1 is true. We can thus assume
ξj < 1. Observe that Y j can be obtained as follows: Generate a random number c distributed
according to the distribution Y j |(Y j ≤ βj) and then output a random number according to Y jc .
This immediately implies
REV A(G(j), β) = Ec(REV
A(Y 1u1 × · · · × Y
j−1
uj−1
× Y jc × Y
j+1 × · · · × Y k)). (2)
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Eq. 1 now follows from Eq. 2. This finishes Step 1.
For Step 2, take an IR-IC mechanism M (with allocation q and payment s) achieving
Ez∼Yu(s(z, β)) = REV
A(Yu, β). By Lemma 4.1, we can take M to be u-exclusive.
Consider a new mechanism M ′ with allocation q′ and payment s′ satisfying q′(z′) = q(z)
and s′(z′) = s(z), where z is defined by zj = max{z′j , uj}. It is straightforward to verify
that M ′ is IR, IC and satisfies Ez′∼Yγ (s
′(z′, β)) = Ez∼Yu(s(z, β)). This proves REV
A(Yu, β) ≤
REV A(Yγ, β), and finishes Step 2. The proof of Lemma 4.2 is now complete.
Lemma 4.3. REV A(L+β , β) ≤ REV
X(L, β).
Proof. Take an IR-IC mechanism Mwith allocation q and payment s achieving Ez∼L+
β
(s(z, β)) =
REV A(L+β , β). By Lemma 4.1 and the fact L
+
β = Yβ, we can take M to be β-exclusive, and
satisfying
Ez∼L+
β
(s(z)) = REV A(L+β , β). (3)
Now consider mechanism M ′ with allocation q′ and payment s′ defined by: q′(z′) = q(z) and
s(z′) = s(z) where zj = max{z′j , βj}. It is easy to check that M ′ is β-exclusive, IR-IC, and
satisfies Ez∼L(s
′(z)) = Ez∼L+
β
(s(z)), and hence by Eq. 3
Ez∼L(s
′(z)) = REV A(L+β , β).
This proves Lemma 4.3.
It follows from Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 that, to establish Theorem 1, it suffices to prove
REV (L−β ) ≤ 8REV
A(L+β , β), (4)
to which we will devote the rest of this section.
Let M , with allocation q and payment s, be an IR-IC mechanism achieving optimal revenue
for distribution L−β . It is well known (see [18]) that, without loss of generality we can assume
M to have the NPT (no-positive-transfer) property, i.e., s(z) ≥ 0 for all z. Furthermore,
we can without loss of generality assume that M is γ-exclusive where γ = (0, · · · , 0), i.e.,
qj(z) = 0 whenever zj = 0. (Otherwise, we can simply set qj(z) to 0 whenever zj = 0.) We
will construct a new mechanism M ′ which, for distribution L+β , has β-adjusted revenue on a par
with Ez∼L−
β
(s(z)).
Let D be the support of L−β , that is, D = (z
1, z2, · · · , zk) where zj ∈ (βj,∞) ∪ {0}. The
multi-set {(q(z), s(z)) | z ∈ D} can be considered as a menu for M, so that the bidder with
valuation z can choose an entry (q∗, s∗) from this set to maximize the utility q∗z − s∗.
To construct M ′, we modify this menu by deleting some entries and then lowering the
payment for all remaining entries. Let a > 1 and 0 < b < 1 be two parameters satisfying b > 1
a
.
A value z ∈ D is said to be profitable if
s(z) ≥ a(βq(z)) (5)
9
where as usual βq(z) =
∑k
j=1 β
jqj(z). Let D0 ⊆ D be the set of all profitable values. We
construct for M ′ the following menu:
M′ = {(q(z), bs(z))| z ∈ D0} (6)
where we denote the closure of a set S ⊆ Rk+1 by S. Note that γ ∈ D0, and hence M
′ has an
entry (q(γ), bs(γ)) = (0, 0) to ensure the IR property.
By definition of menu, the allocation q′ and payment s′ for M ′ are determined as follows:
For any bid z′ ∈ [0,∞)k, let q′(z′) = u and s′(z′) = v where (u, v) is chosen from entries in
M′ to maximize uz′ − v. Clearly, M ′ is IR and IC. We will show that M ′ yields the desired
β-adjusted revenue.
For each z ∈ D, let ψ(z) = z′ where z′j = max{zj , βj}. Intuitively, Ez∼L−
β
(s(z)) is approxi-
mated well by contributions from just the profitable values z. For such z, and its corresponding
z′ = ψ(z) in the support of L+β , we show that the effective payment s
′(z′, β) is at least a fraction
of the payment from the natural candidate entry (q(z), bs(z)) in M′. (We remark that the
lowering of the payment in M′ plays a crucial role in ensuring this property.) Let us define
c = 1−
1
1 + a(1− b)
. (7)
Clearly, 0 < c < 1.
Lemma 4.4. Let z ∈ D0 be a profitable value, then s
′(z′, β) ≥ (b− 1
a
)cs(z) where z′ = ψ(z).
Proof. Suppose the lemma is false. Then there must exist in M′ an entry (q(u), b s(u)) with
u ∈ D0 such that:
s′(z′, β) < (b−
1
a
)cs(z), (8)
where s′(z′, β) = bs(u)−
∑
j, z′j=βj q
j(u)βj, and
q(z)z′ − bs(z) ≤ q(u)z′ − bs(u). (9)
We derive a contradiction.
Note that as u ∈ D0, we have
∑
j q
j(u)βj ≤ 1
a
s(u). Thus
s′(z′, β) ≥ (b−
1
a
)s(u). (10)
It follows from Eqs. 8, 10 that
s(u) < cs(z). (11)
Note that as M is IR and IC,
z(q(z)− q(u)) ≥ s(z)− s(u). (12)
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From Eq. 9,
0 ≥ q(z)z′ − q(u)z′ − bs(z) + bs(u)
≥ q(z)z − q(u)z −
∑
j
βjqj(u)− bs(z) + bs(u).
By Eq. 12 and the fact u ∈ D0, we have then
0 ≥ s(z)− s(u)−
1
a
s(u)− bs(z) + bs(u)
= (1− b+
1
a
)(cs(z)− s(u)),
contradicting Eq. 11. This proves Lemma 4.4.
Using Lemma 4.4, and the fact that s′(z′, β) ≥ 0 (see Eq. 10) for all z′, we obtain
Ez′∼L+
β
(s′(z′, β)) = Ez∼L−
β
(s′(ψ(z), β))
≥ Ez∼L−
β
(Iz∈D0s
′(ψ(z), β))
≥ Ez∼L−
β
(Iz∈D0(b−
1
a
)c s(z))
= (b−
1
a
)c(Ez∼L−
β
(s(z))−Ez∼L−
β
(Iz∈D−D0s(z))). (13)
Since s(z) < a
∑
j β
jqj(z) for z ∈ D −D0, we have
Ez∼L−
β
(Iz∈D−D0s(z)) < aEz∼L−
β
(
∑
j
βjqj(z))
= a
k∑
j=1
βjEz∼L−
β
(Izj>0q
j(z))
≤ a
k∑
j=1
βjPry∼Lj{y > β
j}
= a
k∑
j=1
βjξj. (14)
It follows from Eqs. 13 and 14 that
Ez∼L+
β
(s′(z, β)) ≥ (b−
1
a
)c (Ez∼L−
β
(s(z))− a
k∑
j=1
βjξj).
This proves
REV A(L+β , β) ≥ (b−
1
a
)c (REV (L−β )− a
k∑
j=1
βjξj).
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Hence
REV (L−β ) ≤
1
(b− 1
a
)c
REV A(L+β , β) + a
k∑
j=1
βjξj.
Taking a = 4, b = 3
4
and c = 1
2
, we obtain
REV (L−β ) ≤ 4REV
A(L+β , β) + 4
k∑
j=1
βjξj.
But the term
∑k
j=1 β
jξj is bounded by REV A(L+β , β), as pricing items at β
j will yield β-adjusted
revenue βξ. This then completes the proof of Eq. 4, and hence the β-Exclusion Theorem.
Remarks: In the above derivation, we have set the values of parameters a, b, c to optimize
the resulted bound.
5 Proof of Theorem 2
5.1 An Upper Bound for Revenue
It is of interest to compare BG(F) with the revenue achieved by using a relaxed version of the
Best-Guess Reduction (BGR). Suppose in the description of BGR, one were to drop the require-
ment of B(x−i)-exclusive mechanisms, but use any general mechanism with optimal B(x−i)-
adjusted revenue (while everything else is kept the same). The resulting revenue, denoted by
BGA(F) is defined formally as follows.
Definition 5.1. Define BGA(F) to be
∑n
i=1Ex−i(REV
A(Xi|x−i , B(x−i))).
Theorem 5.1 shows that the quantity BGA(F) provides a useful upper bound to REV (F)
for arbitrary distribution F . In the next subsection we will show that this bound is tight when
the items are independent.
Theorem 5.1. Best-Guess Reduction and Mechanism BG are both DSIR-DSIC mechanisms.
Furthermore, for any distribution F ,
BG(F) ≤ REV (F) ≤ BGA(F) + E(X
[2nd]
F ).
The rest of this subsection will be devoted to proving Theorem 5.1. It is obvious that
both BGR and Mechanism BG are DSIR-DSIC mechanisms for solving the auction problem,
and hence BG(F) ≤ REV (F). It remains to prove the upper bound REV (F) ≤ BGA(F) +
E(X
[2nd]
F ). Consider any mechanism M with allocation q
j
i and payment si. We will prove that
its revenue satisfies
n∑
i=1
Ex∼F(si(x)) ≤
n∑
i=1
Ex−i(REV
A(Xi|x−i , B(x−i))) + E(X
[2nd]
F ), (15)
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which is sufficient to establish the desired upper bound in Theorem 5.1. For each x and buyer
i, let β = B(x−i) and define
si(x, β) = si(x)−
∑
j,xji≤β
j
qji (x)x
j
i . (16)
Then, noting that xji ≤ β
j implies xji ≤ x
j[2nd], we obtain
n∑
i=1
si(x) ≤
n∑
i=1
si(x,B(x−i)) +
n∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
qji (x)x
j[2nd]
=
n∑
i=1
si(x,B(x−i)) +
k∑
j=1
xj[2nd]
n∑
i=1
qji (x)
≤
n∑
i=1
si(x,B(x−i)) +
k∑
j=1
xj[2nd]
=
n∑
i=1
si(x,B(x−i)) + x
[2nd].
This implies
n∑
i=1
Ex∼F(si(x)) ≤
n∑
i=1
Ex∼F(si(x,B(x−i))) + E(X
[2nd]
F ). (17)
Fix i, x−i, and consider the induced IR-IC mechanism M’ (for 1-bidder k-item auction) which,
for bid xi ∈ [0,∞)
k, allocates qji (xi, x−i) for item j and gets payment si(xi, x−i). By Eq. 16 and
the definition of REV A, we have
Exi(si(x,B(x−i))) ≤ REV
A(Xi|x−i , B(x−i)). (18)
Inequality 15 follows immediately from Eqs. 17 and 18. This completes the proof of Theorem
5.1.
5.2 Optimality of Best-Guess
When the items have independent valuation distributions, i.e. F = F1×F2×· · ·×Fk, we show
that the upper and lower bounds in Theorem 5.1 differ by at most a constant factor.
Theorem 5.2. Let F = F1×· · ·×Fk, where F j is item j’s valuation distribution over [0,∞)n.
Then BGA(F) ≤ 8BGR(F).
Proof. Observe that by definition of the Best-Guess Reduction, we have
BGR(F) =
n∑
i=1
Ex−i(REV
X(Xi|x−i , B(x−i))). (19)
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To prove Theorem 5.2, we need to express BGA(F) in similar form and compare it with Eq. 19.
By definition,
BGA(F) =
n∑
i=1
Ex−i(REV
A(Xi|x−i , B(x−i))).
Applying Theorem 1 with L = Xi|x−i, β = B(x−i), and using Eq. 19, we obtain
BGA(F) ≤ 8
n∑
i=1
Ex−i(REV
X(Xi|x−i , B(x−i)))
= 8BGR(F),
and Theorem 5.2 is proved.
By Theorems 5.1 and 5.2, we obtain
REV (F) ≤ 8BGR(F) + E(X
[2nd]
F )
≤ 9max{BGR(F), E(X
[2nd]
F )}
= 9BG(F). (20)
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
The Corollary to Theorem 2 can be proved in a similar way. We modify Theorem 5.2 to read
(and easily verifiable)
BGA(F) ≤ 8αBGRα(F),
and Eq. 20 then becomes
REV (F) ≤ 8αBGRα(F) + E(X
[2nd]
F )
≤ (8α + 1)max{BGRα(F), E(X
[2nd]
F )},
proving the Corollary.
Theorem 5.3. Let SREV (F) be the revenue obtained by selling each item separately and op-
timally. If F = F1 × · · · × Fk, then
SREV (F) >
c
log2(k + 1)
REV (F)
for some universal constant c > 0.
Proof of Theorem 5.3 is done by using the Best-Guess Reduction and applying the c
log2(k+1)
-
approximation result from [22] for the 1-bidder SREV , and will be omitted here.
Theorem 5.3 strengthens results in [27] where such a bound was derived for the case k = 1,
in [18] for the case k = 2, and in [3] for the situation when all nk valuation distributions are
independent. Our result only requires that the items have independent distributions.
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6 Deterministic Best-Guess Reduction
Before proving Theorem 3, we first establish some useful facts about 1-buyer k-item auctions.
For any distribution L over (−∞,∞) and c ∈ (−∞,∞), let L−c denote the distribution obtained
from L by shifting the origin from 0 to c. That is, Prz∼L−c{z > y} = Prz∼L{z > y + c} for all
y.
Definition 6.1. For any distribution L = L1×· · ·×Lk over [0,∞)k and β ∈ [0,∞)k, let L−β
denote the distribution (L1 − β1)× · · · × (Lk − βk).
Recall that L+β is a distribution, with support [β
1,∞)×· · ·×[βk,∞), derived from L as in Def-
inition 4.1. Note that L+β −β is a distribution over [0,∞)
k. The next lemma relates the optimal
revenue achievable by β-exclusive mechanisms to that achievable by general mechanisms (with-
out the β-exclusive restriction). Let ξ(L) = (ξ1(L), · · · , ξk(L)) where ξj(L) = Przj∼Lj{z
j > βj}.
Lemma 6.1. For any L = L1 × · · · × Lk and β, REV X(L, β) ≤ ξ(L)β +REV (L+β − β).
Proof. Given in the Appendix.
We will use a recent result from Babaioff et al. [3]. Let SREV (L) and BREV (L) be the
optimal revenue by selling separately and Grand Bundling, respectively.
Lemma 6.2. ([3]) For any L = L1 × · · · × Lk,
REV (L) ≤ 7.5 max{SREV (L), BREV (L)}.
We now turn to the proof of Theorem 3. It is obvious that DBGR is a deterministic DSIR-
DSIC mechanism. We will show that DBGR is a BGRα-mechanism for α = 8.5; that is,
β-Bundling is an α-approximation to the ideal optimal β-exclusive mechanism.
Theorem 6.1. For any L = L1 × · · · × Lk and β,
Bund(L, β) ≥
1
8.5
REV X(L, β).
Proof. By Lemma 6.1,
REV X(L, β) ≤
k∑
j=1
βjξj(L) +REV (L+β − β). (21)
It is easily seen that
k∑
j=1
βjξj(L) = Mβ,0(L) ≤ Bund(L, β). (22)
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For the other term in Eq. 21, by Lemma 6.2, there exists w ∈ [0,∞) such that
REV (L+β − β) ≤ 7.5 max{w · Prz∼L+
β
{
k∑
j=1
(zj − βj) ≥ w}, SREV (L+β − β)}. (23)
Similar to Eq. 22, for any ǫ > 0, there exists β ≥ β such that
SREV (L+β − β)− ǫ ≤Mβ,0(L) ≤ Bund(L, β).
Thus, taking the limit ǫ→ 0, we obtain
SREV (L+β − β) ≤ Bund(L, β). (24)
Also, it is clear that
Prz∼L+
β
{
k∑
j=1
(zj − βj) ≥ w}
=Prz∼L
∑
j,zj>βj
(zj − βj) ≥ w},
which implies that
w · Prz∼L+
β
(
k∑
j=1
(zj − βj) ≥ w) ≤ Bund(L, β). (25)
With help of Eqs. 24 and 25, we obtain from Eq. 23
REV (L+β − β) ≤ 7.5Bund(L, β). (26)
It follows from Eqs. 21, 22 and 26 that
REV X(L, β) ≤ 8.5Bund(L, β).
This proves Theorem 6.1.
Theorem 3 follows immediately from the Corollary to Theorem 2 (with α = 8.5) and Theorem
6.1.
7 A General Implementation of Best-Guess Reduction
The DBG Mechanism studied in Section 6 is one special way of implementing the Best-Guess
Reduction. In this section we show that any 1-buyer k-item mechanism M with approximation
ratio 1
α
for the revenue can be transformed into an 1-buyer k-item β-exclusive mechanism M ′
yielding at least 1
α+1
of REV X(L, β); then, combined with Corollary to Theorem 2, it gives
an n-buyer k-item mechanism with approximation ratio 1
8α+9
. Viewed in this light, the DBG
Mechanism can be regarded as the special case where M is the mechanism studied in [3].
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Definition 7.1. Given β and M , a 1-buyer k-item mechanism with allocation q and payment s,
we define a mechanism Φβ(M) as follows. First, convertM into an 0-exclusive IR-IC mechanism
simply by setting qj(z) to 0 whenever zj = 0; then
(i) let Φβ,1(M) be the 1-buyer k-item mechanism M
′ with allocation q′ and payment s′ defined
by: for any z′ ∈ [0,∞)k, let z ∈ [0,∞)k where zj = max{z′j − βj, 0} for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and let
q′(z′) = q(z), s′(z′) = s(z) + βq(z);
(ii) let Φβ,2(M) be the 1-buyer k-item mechanism M
′ with allocation q′ and payment s′ defined
by: for any z′ ∈ [0,∞)k and 1 ≤ j ≤ k, let q′j(z′) = 1 if z′j > βj and 0 otherwise; let
s(z′) =
∑
j, z′j>βj β
j.
Define Φβ(M) = Φβ,1(M) if for input distribution L, mechanism Φβ,1(M) yields more (expected)
revenue than Φβ,2(M); otherwise let Φβ(M) = Φβ,2(M).
For α ≥ 1, we say that a mechanism M is an α-approximate mechanism for L if M(L) ≥
1
α
REV (L).
Theorem 7.1. Let α ≥ 1 and L = L1 × · · · × Lk. If M is an IR-IC α-approximate mechanism
for L+β −β, then the mechanism M
′ = Φβ(M) is an IR-IC β-exclusive mechanism. Furthermore,
M ′(L) ≥ 1
α+1
REV X(L, β).
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that, for i = 1 and 2, Φβ,i(M) is IR, IC, and β-exclusive.
It immediately follows that Φβ(M) is also. The proof of the last part of the theorem generalizes
the proof of Theorem 6.1. By Lemma 6.1,
REV X(L, β) ≤ ξ(L)β +REV (L+β − β). (27)
Let M1 = Φβ,1(M) and M2 = Φβ,2(M). Then by definition of M2 and M
′,
ξ(L)β =M2(L) ≤ M
′(L). (28)
To bound the other term in Eq. 27, note that as M is α-approximate for L+β − β we have
REV (L+β − β) ≤ αM(L
+
β − β). (29)
Let M have allocation q and payment s, and M1 have allocation q
′ and payment s′. Then by
definition of M1 = Φβ,1(M) and M
′, we have from Eq. 29
REV (L+β − β) ≤ αEz∼L+
β
−β(s(z))
≤ αEz∼L+
β
−β(s(z) + βq(z)))
= αEz∼L+
β
−β(s
′(z + β))
= αEz′∼L+
β
(s′(z′)) = αEz′∼L(s
′(z′)) = αM1(L)
≤ αM ′(L). (30)
It follows from Eqs. 27, 28 and 30 that
REV X(L, β) ≤ (α + 1)M ′(L).
This proves Theorem 7.1.
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8 Bayesian vs. Dominant Strategy Revenue
We prove Theorem 4 in this section. We first establish an analogous result to Theorem 5.1 For
the Bayesian setting of incentive compatibility, under the assumption of valuation independence
among the bidders. Recall that SREV (F) is the revenue obtained by selling each item separately
and optimally.
Theorem 8.1. Let F = F1 × · · · × Fn, where each Fi is bidder i’s valuation distribution over
[0,∞)k. Then
REVBayesian(F) ≤ BG
A(F) + SREV (F).
Proof. Consider an optimal BIR-BIC mechanism M for F with allocation qji (x), payment si(x)
from buyer i and hence total payment s(x) =
∑n
i=1 si(x). Our goal is to show that
Ex∼F(s(x)) ≤ BG
A(F) + SREV (F). (31)
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, consider the following 1-buyer k-item mechanism Mi for buyer i. For any
valuation xi ∈ [0,∞)
k, let the allocation of Mi be q¯
j
i (xi) = Ex−i(q
j
i (xi, x−i)), and its payment
be s¯i(xi) = Ex−i(si(xi, x−i)), where x−i is distributed according to F−i, the product of Fi′ for
all i′ 6= i. We first note an important property of Mi.
Property P1. Mi is IR and IC: for any xi, x
′
i ∈ [0,∞)
k,
xiq¯i(xi)− s¯i(xi) ≥ 0
xiq¯i(x
′
i)− s¯i(x
′
i) ≤ xiq¯i(xi)− s¯i(xi)
where xiq¯i(xi) stands for
∑k
j=1 x
j
i q¯
j
i (xi).
This property follows directly from the fact that M is BIR and BIC.
We are now ready to analyze the performance of M in comparison with BGA(F), where by
definition
BGA(F) =
n∑
i=1
Ex−i(REV
A(Xi, B(x−i)). (32)
(Recall B(x−i) = (B
1(x−i), · · · , B
k(x−i)), where B
j(x−i) is the value of the maximum of {x
j
i′ |i
′ 6=
i}.)
Given any valuation (xji ), we define for each i, Ii(x) = {j| x
j
i ≤ B
j(x−i)}, and
ti(xi, x−i) = s¯i(xi)−
∑
j∈Ii(x)
q¯ji (xi)x
j
i .
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Then
Ex∼F(s(x)) =
n∑
i=1
Ex∼F(s¯i(xi))
=
n∑
i=1
Ex∼F(ti(xi, x−i)) + Ex∼F(
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ii(x)
q¯ji (xi)x
j
i ) (33)
Lemma 8.1.
∑n
i=1Ex∼F(ti(xi, x−i)) ≤ BG
A(F).
Proof. By Property P1 and definition of REV A, we have for each i, x−i,
Exi∼Fi(ti(xi, x−i)) ≤ REV
A(Xi, B(x−i)).
The lemma now follows from Eq. 32.
Lemma 8.2. Ex∼F(
∑n
i=1
∑
j∈Ii(x)
qji (xi)x
j
i ) ≤ SREV (F).
Proof. Define Qji (x) = 1 if j ∈ Ii(x) and 0 otherwise. Let
Ψ(F) = Ex∼F(
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ii(x)
qji (xi)x
j
i ).
Then
Ψ(F) =
n∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
Ex(x
j
iQ
j
i (x)q
j
i (xi))
=
k∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
Ex−iExi(x
j
iQ
j
i (x)Ez−i(q
j
i (xi, z−i)))
=
k∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
Ex−iExiEz−i(Q
j
i (xi, x−i)x
j
i q
j
i (xi, z−i)).
Relabel xi as zi, and we have
Ψ(F) =
k∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
Ex−iEz(Q
j
i (zi, x−i)z
j
i q
j
i (z))
=
k∑
j=1
Ez(Tj(z)), (34)
where
Tj(z) =
n∑
i=1
Ex−i(Q
j
i (zi, x−i)z
j
i q
j
i (z)).
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For convenience, we define Xj[max] = max{Xji |1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
For any j, z, we have
Tj(z) =
n∑
i=1
qji (z)z
j
iEx−i(Q
j
i (zi, x−i))
=
n∑
i=1
qji (z)z
j
iPrx−i{max{x
j
i′ | i
′ 6= i} ≥ zji }
≤
n∑
i=1
qji (z)z
j
iPrx{X
j[max] ≥ zji }
≤
n∑
i=1
qji (z)REV (X
j[max])
≤ REV (Xj[max]), (35)
where we have used the fact that REV (Xj[max]) = supy≥0 y(Pr{X
j[max] ≥ y}) is the optimal
Myerson revenue for a single item with value distribution Xj[max] = max{Xji | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
Thus, from Eqs. 34 and 35,
Ψ(F) ≤
k∑
j=1
REV (Xj[max]) ≤ SREV (F).
This proves Lemma 8.2.
From Eq. 33 and Lemmas 8.1, 8.2, we immediately obtain Eq. 31. This completes the proof
of Theorem 8.1.
We can now prove Theorem 4. Let F = ⊗i,jF
j
i . By Theorem 5.2, we have BG
A(F) ≤
8BGR(F) ≤ 8REV (F). It then follows from Theorem 8.1 that
REVBayesian(F) ≤ BG
A(F) + SREV (F) ≤ 9REV (F),
which completes the proof of Theorem 4.
9 Optimal Revenue in I.D.D. Case
We will prove Theorem 5 in this section. We first give some notations and lemmas.
Definition 9.1. For any distribution F on [0,∞) and integer ℓ ≥ 1, define rF = supx≥0 x(1 −
F (x)),
Aℓ(F ) = rF +
∫ ℓrF
0
(1− F (x)) dx and Cℓ(F ) =
∫ ℓrF
0
x dF (x).
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Property P2. rF + Cℓ(F ) ≤ Aℓ(F ) ≤ 2rF + Cℓ(F ) for any ℓ ≥ 1.
The proof of Property P2 is given in the Appendix. The following lemma from Li and Yao
[22] will also be useful.
Lemma 9.1. [22] For any distribution L over [0,∞) and integer ℓ, REV (L⊗k) = Θ(k Ak(L)).
In the rest of this section, for any distribution F on [0,∞), we reserve the symbols Fˆ to
denote the distribution defined by Fˆ (x) = (F (x))n, and m to denote ⌈k/n⌉. We can restate
Theorem 5(a) as follows:
For F = F n⊗k, REV (F) = Θ(k Am(Fˆ )). (36)
In this section, for convenience we allow the value distributions to have support on (−∞,∞)k
instead of [0,∞)k. All the terms such as mechanisms, IR, IC, REV, etc. are defined exactly as
previously.
Let L = L1 × · · · ×Lk, where Lj = L for a common distribution L over (−∞,∞). Let Y be
a random variable distributed according to L. Let p = Pr{Y > 0}, and let Z be the conditional
distribution Y | (Y > 0).
Lemma 9.2.
REV (L) ≤
k∑
ℓ=0
(
k
ℓ
)
pℓ(1− p)k−ℓREV (Z⊗ℓ).
Proof. Obviously, we can assume p > 0. For any I ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , k}, z ∈ [0,∞)k, let I =
{1, · · · , k} − I, zI = (yi|i ∈ I) and zI = (yi|i 6∈ I). Let M be any IR-IC mechanism for L, with
allocation q and payment s. We show that
Ez∼L(s(z)) ≤
k∑
ℓ=0
(
k
ℓ
)
pℓ(1− p)k−ℓREV (Z⊗ℓ). (37)
Fix any I ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , k}, zI ∈ (−∞, 0]|I|. We construct a mechanism M ′ for valuation zI ∈
(0,∞)|I|, with allocation q′ and payment s′ defined as follows. Let
q′j(zI) = qj(zI , zI) for j ∈ I,
s′(zI) = s(zI , zI)−
∑
j∈I
zjqj(zI , zI).
Note that s′(zI) ≥ s(zI , zI). It is straightforward to check that M ′ is IR and IC. By definition
of REV , we have
EzI (s
′(zI)) ≤ REV (Z⊗|I|).
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For a random z ∈ L, let I denote the random variable corresponding to the set {j| zj > 0}.
Then
Ez∼L(s(z)) = EIEzIEzI (s(z))
≤ EIEzI (EzI (s
′(z)))
≤ EIREV (Z
⊗|I|)
=
k∑
ℓ=1
(
k
ℓ
)
pℓ(1− p)k−ℓREV (Z⊗ℓ).
This proves Eq. 37 and hence Lemma 9.2.
We will prove the upper and lower bounds of Theorem 5 in the next two subsections, respec-
tively.
9.1 Revenue Upper bound
In this subsection we prove the upper bound in Theorem 5, i.e., showing that for distributions
of the form F = F n⊗k,
REV (F) ≤ O(k Am(Fˆ )). (38)
To directly use the upper bound technique developed in Section 5 for the current purpose is
possible, but it involves lengthy calculations. Instead, we will use a variant of Theorem 5.1.
Let F be any distribution over [0,∞)nk for the n-buyer k-item auction. First, as a counterpart
of BGA(F), we define below FXβ(F), which is a version of adjusted revenue but with a fixed
adjustment β for all bidders (rather than using B(x−i)-adjusted revenue for bidder i, as in
Definition 5.1).
Definition 9.2. For any fixed β ∈ [0,∞)k, let FXβ(F) =
∑n
i=1Ex−i(REV ((Xi − β)|x−i)).
Theorem 9.1. For any n-bidder k-item valuation distribution F , REV (F) ≤ FXβ(F) + ‖β‖,
where ‖β‖ =
∑
j β
j.
Proof. The proof follows from the same outline as the proof of Theorem 5.1 (but simpler), and
will be omitted.
We next consider some simple properties of the distributions Fˆ (x) andHF (x) where HF (x) ≡
1−F (x). Let x0 ∈ [0,∞) be the unique real number satisfying HF (x0−) ≥
1
n
≥ HF (x0). Writing
HFˆ (x) as b(HF (x)), where b(z) = 1− (1− z)
n. Clearly, b(z) is an increasing function of z, and
one can easily verify that b(1/n) ≥ 1/e. Thus, HFˆ (x0−) ≥ b(1/n) ≥ 1/e. This shows
rFˆ ≥ x0HFˆ (x0−) ≥
x0
e
. (39)
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Without loss of generality, one can assume HF (x0) 6= 0. Otherwise, REV (F) ≤ kx0 and hence
Eq. 38 is already satisfied due to Eq. 39. Let F0 denote the distribution F conditioned on
x > x0:
F0(x) =
{
1− HF (x)
HF (x0)
for x ≥ x0,
0 for x < x0.
Let β = (β1, · · · , βk), where βj = x0 for all j. By definition,
FXβ(F) =
n∑
i=1
REV (Xi − β). (40)
Let i ∈ {1, · · · , n} be fixed, and let p = HF (x0) ≤ 1/n. Lemma 9.2 implies that
REV (Xi − β) ≤
k∑
ℓ=0
(
k
ℓ
)
pℓ(1− p)k−ℓREV ((F0 − x0)
⊗ℓ)
≤
k∑
ℓ=0
(
k
ℓ
)
pℓ(1− p)k−ℓREV (F⊗ℓ0 )
where we have used the elementary fact REV ((F0 − x0)
⊗ℓ) ≤ REV (F⊗ℓ0 ). By Lemma 9.1, we
have REV (F⊗ℓ0 ) ≤ c ℓAℓ(F0) for some constant c > 0. This leads to
REV (Xi − βi) ≤ c
k∑
ℓ=0
(
k
ℓ
)
pℓ(1− p)k−ℓℓAℓ(F0). (41)
Eqs. 40 and 41 give an upper bound to FXβ(F) in terms of Aℓ(F0). To derive Eq. 38, we
only need to relate Aℓ(F0) to Am(Fˆ ).
Property P3. Let h = ⌈kp⌉ and dn,k(F ) =
∑k
ℓ=1
(
k
ℓ
)
pℓ(1 − p)k−ℓℓAℓ(F0). There exists a
constant c′ > 0 such that for all n, k, F , we have dn,k(F ) ≤ c
′kpAh(F0).
Property P4. For h = ⌈kp⌉, we have Ah(F0) ≤
c′′
pn
Am(Fˆ ) where c
′′ = e + e ln(2e).
The proofs of Properties P3 and P4 are given in the Appendix. Using Properties P3 and P4,
we obtain from Eqs. 40 and 41 that
FXβ(F) ≤ cn
k∑
ℓ=0
(
k
ℓ
)
pℓ(1− p)k−ℓℓAℓ(F0)
= cn dn,k(F )
≤ cc′nkpAh(F0)
≤ cc′c′′kAm(Fˆ ). (42)
By Theorem 9.1, REV (F) ≤ FXβ(F) + ‖β‖. As ‖β‖ = kx0 ≤ k e rFˆ ≤ k eAm(Fˆ ) by Eq. 39,
this together with Eq. 47 implies Eq. 42, completing the upper abound proof of Theorem 5.
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9.2 Optimality of Second-Price Bundling
In this subsection, we prove that SPB is IR-IC and
SPB(F) ≥ Ω(k Am(Fˆ )) where m = ⌈k/n⌉. (43)
Clearly SPB is IR, as it makes only take-or-leave offers. We show that SPB is also IC. Let
(xji ) be the true valuation. If player i reports his valuation truthfully, his utility u1 is equal to∑
j∈V (x
j
i − z
j) − w where zj = max{xji′ | i
′ 6= i} and V = {j| xji > z
j}. If player i reports an
untruthful valuation y = (yj| 1 ≤ j ≤ k) for the k items, then his utility u2 will be
∑
j∈W (x
j
i −
zj)−w for someW ⊆ {j|yj ≥ zj}. Since xji−z
j ≤ 0 for all j 6∈ V , we conclude that u2 ≤ u1, and
player i gains no advantage by reporting false valuation. This proves SPB (with any parameter
w) is IC.
We next show that for some properly chosen w (dependent on F only), SPB can achieve an
expected revenue of at least Ω(kAm(Fˆ )). We will choose the parameter w as follows.
Case 1. E(VF ) ≥
1
5
max{rFˆ ,
Cm(Fˆ )
80
}. In this case, by simply setting w = 0, the SPB has exactly
the same effect as selling each item separately with Vickrey’s 2nd-price payment, yielding a
revenue kE(VF ) ≥ Ω(kAm(Fˆ )).
Case 2. E(VF ) <
1
5
max{rFˆ ,
Cm(Fˆ )
80
}. In this case, pick some u such that uHFˆ (u) ≥
4
5
rFˆ . Define
q0 = Pr{WF − VF ≥
u
2
}, and define w0 = u/2 if mq0 ≤ 1 and w0 = ⌊q0m⌋u/2 if mq0 > 1.
Choose the parameter w to be
w =
{
1
4
mCm(Fˆ ) if Cm(Fˆ ) ≥ 80 rFˆ ,
w0 if Cm(Fˆ ) < 80 rFˆ .
(44)
Lemma 9.3. In Case 2, with the parameter w as defined in Eq. 44, SPB can achieve expected
revenue at least Ω(kAm(Fˆ )).
The proof of Lemma 9.3 is given in the Appendix. Thus Eq. 43 is valid for all F (either
Case 1 or Case 2). This completes the proof of Theorem 5.
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Appendix
Note 1: Proof of Lemma 6.1
Let M be any IR-IC β-exclusive mechanism with allocation q and payment s. To establish
the lemma, we prove
Ez∼L(s(z)) ≤ ξ(L)β +REV (L
+
β − β), (A1)
where ξj(L) = Przj∼Lj (z
j > βj), and ξ(L) = (ξ1(L), · · · , ξk(L)).
Fact 1. Ez∼L(s(z)) ≤ ξ(L)β + Ez∼L(s(z)− q(z)β).
Proof. Simply note that Ez∼L(s(z)) = Ez∼L(q(z)β)+Ez∼L(s(z)−q(z)β) = ξ(L)β+Ez∼L(s(z)−
q(z)β).
We construct a mechanism M ′ with allocation q′ and payment s′, so that it has a good
expected revenue s′(z′)− q′(z′)β for z′ ∼ L+β .
For any z ∈ [0,∞)k, define ψ(z) = z′ where z′j = max{zj , βj}. Clearly, ψ(z) ∈ [β1,∞) ×
· · ·× [βk,∞). We now define q′, s′. For any z′ ∈ [β1,∞)×· · ·× [βk,∞), let z = argmaxz{s(z)−
q(z)β| z ∈ ψ−1(z′)}. Let q′(z′) = q(z) and s′(z′) = s(z).
Fact 2. M ′ is IR-IC and Ez∼L(s(z)− q(z)β) ≤ Ez′∼L+
β
(s′(z′)− q′(z′)β).
Proof. For any z′ in the support of L+β , i.e., z
′ ∈ [β1,∞)×· · ·×[βk,∞), let I(z′) = {j| z′j > βj}.
As M is β-exclusive, we must have for any z ∈ ψ−1(z′), qj(z) = 0 if j 6∈ I(z′). This has several
implications. First, for any z ∈ ψ−1(z′), q(z)z′ − s(z) = q(z)z − s(z) ≥ 0, since M is IR. This
means q′(z)z′ − s′(z′) ≥ 0, i.e., M ′ is IR.
We now prove M ′ is IC. Define the function u(y, z) = yq(z) − s(z), the utility under M
obtained when the valuation is y but reporting z. We claim that for any y, z ∈ ψ−1(z′), u(y, z) =
u(y, y). To prove this claim, take M’s IC condition y(q(z) − q(y)) ≤ s(z) − s(y) ≤ z(q(z) −
q(y)). This leads to s(z) − s(y) =
∑
j∈I(z′) z
′j(qj(z) − qj(y)), implying u(z, z) = u(y, y). It
is then straightforward to verify that u(y, z) = u(y, y). In particular, take y = z′, and let
z = argmaxz{s(z)−q(z)β| z ∈ ψ
−1(z′)} as chosen in the construction ofM ′. We have u(z′, z) =
u(z′, z′). This means that the utility under M ′ for valuation z′ remains the same as under M.
Thus, no advantage is gained by false reporting. This proves that M ′ is IC.
Finally, note that z ∈ ψ−1(z′) implies s(z) − q(z)β ≤ s′(z′) − q′(z′)β. It follows that
Ez∼L(s(z)− q(z)β) ≤ Ez′∼L+
β
(s′(z′)− q′(z′)β). This completes the proof of Fact 2.
Fact 3. Ez′∼L+
β
(s′(z′)− q′(z′)β) ≤ REV (L+β − β).
Proof. Define mechanism M ′′ for distribution L+β − β with allocation q
′′ and payment s′′ by
q′′(z) = q′(z + β), s′′(z) = s′(z + β)− βq′(z + β),
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for all z ∈ [0,∞)k. It is straightforward to verify that M ′′ is IR and IC. It follows that
Ez∼L+
β
(s′(z)− βq′(z)) = Ez∼L+
β
−β(s
′(z + β)− βq′(z + β))
= Ez∼L+
β
−β(s
′′(z))
≤ REV (L+β − β).
Facts 1-3 imply immediately Eq. A1. This proves Lemma 6.1.
Note 2: Proof of Property P2
It is easy to see that
Cℓ(F ) = −
∫ ℓrF
0
x d(1− F (x)) = −x(1 − F (x))|ℓrF0 +
∫ ℓrF
0
(1− F (x)) dx
= −ℓrF (1− F (ℓrF )) + Aℓ(F )− rF .
Using the fact 1 − F (ℓrF ) ≤
rF
ℓrF
= 1
ℓ
, we thus obtain 0 ≤ Aℓ(F ) − (rF + Cℓ(F )) ≤ rF , and it
follows that
rF + Cℓ(F ) ≤ Aℓ(F ) ≤ 2rF + Cℓ(F ).
This proves Property P2.
Note 3: Proof of Property P3
By definition, Aℓ(F0) = r0 +
∫ ℓr
0
(1 − F0(x)) dx, where r0 = rF0 = supx≥0 x(1 − F0(x)). For
ℓ ≥ h,
Aℓ(F0)− Ah(F0) =
∫ ℓr
hr
(1− F0(x)) dx
≤
∫ ℓr
hr
r0
x
dx = r0 ln
ℓ
h
. (A2)
Note that it implies, for all ℓ ≤ 2eh,
Aℓ(F0) ≤ Ah(F0) + r0 ln(2e). (A3)
Using Eqs. A2, A3, we have
dn,k(F ) ≤
k∑
ℓ=1
(
k
ℓ
)
pℓ(1− p)k−ℓ · ℓ(Ah(F0) + r0 ln(2e))
+ r0
∑
ℓ>2eh
(
k
ℓ
)
pℓ(1− p)k−ℓ · ℓ ln
ℓ
h
.
28
Simplifying, we have
dn,k(F ) ≤ kp(Ah(F0) + r0 ln(2e)) + r0ξ, (A4)
where
ξ =
∑
ℓ>2eh
(
k
ℓ
)
pℓ(1− p)k−ℓ · ℓ ln
ℓ
h
.
To estimate ξ, we use Stirling’s approximation to obtain
ξ ≤
∑
ℓ>2eh
kℓ
ℓ!
· pℓ · ℓ ln
ℓ
h
≤
∑
ℓ>2eh
(
kep
ℓ
)ℓ · ℓ ln
ℓ
h
≤ ekp
∑
ℓ>2eh
ln ℓ
2ℓ−1
≤ β3kp, (A5)
where β3 is the constant
∑
ℓ≥1
e ln ℓ
2ℓ−1
. Property P3 follows from Eqs. A4, A5.
Note 4: Proof of Property P4
We first derive a simple relation between HFˆ and H , where H stands for HF .
Fact 4. If nH(x) ≤ 1, then nH(x) ≥ HFˆ (x) ≥ nH(x)/e.
Proof. Assume nH(x) ≤ 1, we show nH(x) ≥ HFˆ (x) ≥
1
e
nH(x). It is easy to check that 1−z ≤
e−z ≤ 1 − z/e for all z ∈ [0, 1]. It follows that (1 −H(x))n ≤ e−nH(x) ≤ 1 − nH(x)/e, implying
HFˆ (x) = 1 − (1 −H(x))
n ≥ nH(x)/e. Furthermore, it is easy to verify that (1 − z)n − 1 + nz
is non-negative over z ∈ [0, 1] by taking derivatives. This immediately leads to nH(x) ≥ HFˆ (x)
by letting z = H(x).
Let H0(x) stand for HF0(x) = 1−F0(x), and r0 stand for rF0. By definition, H0(x) =
1
p
H(x)
for x ≥ x0, where p = H(x0). It follows from pn ≤ 1 and Fact 4 that, for x ≥ x0, HFˆ (x) ≤
H0(x) ≤
e
pn
HFˆ (x); and these inequalities are easily checked to be true actually for all x. This
immediately implies
rFˆ ≤ r0 ≤
e
pn
rFˆ . (A6)
If kp ≤ 1, then h = 1, and
Ah(F0) ≤ 2r0 ≤
2e
pn
rFˆ ≤
2e
pn
Am(Fˆ ),
satisfying Property P5. We can thus assume kp > 1. In this case from A6
hr0 ≤ 2kp
e
pn
rFˆ ≤ 2emrFˆ . (A7)
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Hence, from A6-A7 we have∫ hr0
0
H0(x) dx ≤
e
pn
∫ 2emr
Fˆ
0
HFˆ (x) dx
=
e
pn
(
∫ mr
Fˆ
0
HFˆ (x) dx+
∫ 2emr
Fˆ
mr
Fˆ
HFˆ (x) dx)
≤
e
pn
(
∫ mr
Fˆ
0
HFˆ (x) dx+
∫ 2emr
Fˆ
mr
Fˆ
rFˆ
x
dx)
≤
e
pn
(ln(2e))Am(Fˆ ). (A8)
From Eqs. A6 and A8, we obtain
Ah(F0) = r0 +
∫ hr0
0
H0(x) dx
≤
e
pn
rFˆ +
e
pn
(ln(2e))Am(Fˆ )
≤
c′′
pn
Am(Fˆ ),
This proves Property P4.
Note 5: Proof of Lemma 9.3
We first cite two earlier results from references [18] and [22].
Fact 5. [22] Let m > 1 be any integer, and G be a distribution on [0,∞) satisfying Cm(G) >
10rG. Let Z1, · · · , Zm be m iid distributions of G. Then Pr{
∑m
i=1 Zi ≥
1
2
mCm(G)} ≥
3
4
.
Fact 6. [18] Let Z1, · · · , Zm be m iid distributions of a one-dimensional distribution on [0,∞),
and t > 0 be any real number. Define w = t if qm ≤ 1, and w = t⌊qm⌋ if qm > 1, where
q = Pr{Zi ≥ t}. Then w · Pr{
∑m
i=1 Zi ≥ w} ≥
1
4
mqt.
We also need the following estimate on a certain type of probability arising in our analysis.
Fact 7. Let n, k > 1 and m = ⌈k/n⌉. Let bn,k =
∑
ℓ≥m
(
k
ℓ
)
1
nℓ
(1 − 1
n
)k−ℓ. Then bn,k ≥
k
en
if
k ≤ n, and bn,k ≥
1
14
if k > n.
Proof. Case 1: k
n
≤ 1. Then m = ⌈k/n⌉ = 1, and bn,k ≥
k
n
(1 − 1
n
)k−1 ≥ k
n
(1 − 1
n
)n−1. But
(1− 1
n
)n−1 ≥ 1
e
for all n ≥ 2, hence bn,k ≥
k
en
.
Case 2: k
n
> 1. It is well known in statistics that the median lies to the left of the mean for
binomial distributions. Hence
b′n,k ≥ 1/2 (A9)
where
b′n,k =
∑
ℓ≥⌊k/n⌋
(
k
ℓ
)
1
nℓ
(1−
1
n
)k−ℓ. (A10)
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We will show that
b′n,k ≤ 7bn,k, (A11)
which together with Eq. A9 implies bn,k ≥
1
14
, hence proving Fact 7. We can assume k/n to be
non-integral; otherwise bn,k = b
′
n,k. Note that from Eq. A10
b′n,k − bn,k =
(
k
m− 1
)
1
nm−1
(1−
1
n
)k−m+1,
and
bn,k ≥
(
k
m
)
1
nm
(1−
1
n
)k−m.
Thus, to prove Eq. A11 it suffices to show(
k
m− 1
)
1
nm−1
(1−
1
n
)k−m+1 ≤ 6
(
k
m
)
1
nm
(1−
1
n
)k−m.
This is equivalent to proving n(1− 1/n) ≤ 6(k −m+ 1)/m, that is,
(n− 1)m ≤ 6(k −m+ 1), or (n+ 5)m ≤ 6(k + 1). (A12)
But Eq. A12 is easy to prove: using the inequality n+ 5k/n ≤ 5k + 1 for n < k, we have
(n + 5)m = (n+ 5)⌈k/n⌉ ≤ (n+ 5)(
k
n
+ 1)
= n+
5k
n
+ k + 5 ≤ 6(k + 1).
This proves Eq. A11, hence the proof of Fact 7 is complete.
We now proceed to prove Lemma 9.3. The proof is accomplished through a series of Facts.
Recall that m = ⌈ k
n
⌉, and it is assumed that
E(VF ) <
1
5
max{rFˆ ,
Cm(Fˆ )
80
}. (A13)
Let J = (J1, J2 . . . , Jn) ∈ J . When Ti = Ji, player i accepts the seller’s offer if and only
if XJi[max] ≥ XJi[2nd] + w. Let P Jiw be the acceptance probability. Note that P
Ji
w ≤ P
J ′i
w if
Ji ⊆ J
′
i, since Ji can be embedded as the first |Ji| items of J
′
i without decreasing the acceptance
probability. Also, P Jiw can be written as Pw(|Ji|), as it depends only on w and the cardinality of
Ji.
Fact 8. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ex∼F(si(x)) ≥ Pr{|Ti| ≥ m}Pw(m) · w.
Proof. Immediate from the definitions and monotonicity of Pw(m).
31
Fact 9. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
Pr{|Ti| ≥ m} ≥
{
k
en
if k ≤ n,
1
14
if k > n.
Proof. Note that Pr{|Ti| ≥ m} =
∑
m′≥m
(
k
m′
)
1
nm′
(1− 1
n
)k−m
′
. Fact 9 follows from Fact 7.
Let Y1, Y2 . . . , Yn be iid each distributed as F . DefineWF = maxi Yi and VF = 2nd max of all Yi.
Call (WF , VF ) a canonical pair. Let |Ji| = m. One can write X
Ji[max] =
∑m
j=1Wj and
XJi[2nd] =
∑m
j=1 Vj , where (W1, V1), . . . , (Wm, Vm) are m iid canonical pairs of random variables.
Then Pw(m) can be written as the probability of the event
m∑
j=1
Wj ≥
m∑
j=1
Vj + w. (A14)
Recall that we have chosen the parameter w as defined in Eq. 49 of the main text.
Fact 10. Let Dm(Fˆ ) = max{rFˆ ,
1
80
Cm(Fˆ )}. Then wPm(w) ≥
1
20
mDm(Fˆ ).
Proof. We consider two separate cases.
Case A. Cm(Fˆ ) ≥ 80 rFˆ .
We have w = 1
4
mCm(Fˆ ). As Cm(Fˆ ) ≤ mrFˆ obviously, we have m > 1. From Fact 5, we have
a = Pr{W1 +W2 + · · ·+Wm ≥ 2w} ≥
3
4
.
Also, by Markov’s Inequality and Eq. A13,
b = Pr{V1 + V2 + · · ·+ Vm ≥ w} ≤ Pr{V1 + V2 + · · ·+ Vm ≥ 2mE(VF )} ≤
1
2
.
Thus,
Pm(w) = Pr{
m∑
i=1
Wi ≥
m∑
i=1
Vi + w} ≥ a− b ≥
1
4
,
and
wPm(w) ≥
1
16
mCm(Fˆ ) >
m
20
Dm(Fˆ ),
as required.
Case B. Cm(Fˆ ) < 80rFˆ .
We first derive some useful information (Eq. A17 below). In Case B, we have from Eq. A13
E(VF ) <
1
5
rFˆ , (A15)
32
and u, q0, w satisfying the conditions
uHFˆ (u) ≥
4
5
rFˆ , (A16)
q0 = Pr{WF − VF ≥
u
2
},
w =
{
u/2, if mq0 ≤ 1 ;
⌊mq0⌋u/2, if mq0 > 1.
It follows from Eqs A15, A16 and Markov’s Inequality that
Pr{VF ≤
u
2
} ≤
E(VF )
u/2
<
1
5
rFˆ
2
5
r
Fˆ
H
Fˆ
(u)
=
1
2
HFˆ (u).
This implies
q0 ≥ Pr{WF > u} − Pr{VF ≤
u
2
} ≥
1
2
HFˆ (u). (A17)
We are now ready to analyze wPm(w) for Case B. Apply Fact 6 with Zj = Wj − Vj and t =
u
2
,
we have
wPm(w) = w · Pr{
m∑
j=1
(Wj − Vj) ≥ w} ≥
uq0m
8
. (A18)
From Eqs. A16-A18,
wPm(w) ≥
mu
8
·
HFˆ (u)
2
≥
m
16
4
5
rFˆ =
m
20
rFˆ .
The assumption of Case B implies rFˆ = Dm(Fˆ ), thus we obtain wPm(w) ≥
1
20
mDm(Fˆ ). This
completes the proof of Fact 10.
Now, Facts 8-10 together imply that for k ≤ n (hence for m = 1),
Ex∼F(si(x)) ≥
k
20en
Dm(Fˆ ).
Similarly, for k > n,
Ex∼F(si(x)) ≥
1
280
mDm(Fˆ ) ≥
1
280
k
n
Dm(Fˆ ).
This implies that, by choosing w either way as in Eq. 44 (of the main text), we have
Ex∼F(s(x)) =
n∑
i=1
Ex∼F(si(x)) ≥ ckDm(Fˆ ) ≥ Ω(kAm(Fˆ ))
where c = 1
280
. Hence the proof of Lemma 9.3 is complete.
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